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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICK M. SLOAN. 
Plaintiff (Petitioner) 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, ROTO 
ROOTER SERVICES and S & S ROOTER 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants (Respondents). 
Case No. 900037-CA 
Classification #6 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sections 35-1-86 (1988) and 
78-2a-3(2) (a) (1989). This appeal is from an Order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah denying Plaintiff's claim for an 
increase in permanent partial impairment and temporary total 
benefits. 
Plaintiff filed four separate Applications for Hearing 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking an increase in 
permanent partial impairment compensation, temporary total 
compensation and continued medical coverage as allowed pursuant to 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-1 et seq (R. 32-37). 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-24 Utah Code Annotated, an 
evidentiary hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on 
September 22. 1988. At the time of hearing, Plaintiff offered into 
evidence two medical reports from Dr. Robert H. Lamb one dated March 
25. 1988 and one dated September 19. 1988. Defendants offered a 
binder of medical records divided into four categories basically 
relating to the four different industrial accidents; I - 1985, II -
1984. Ill - 1983. and IV - 1981. The medical evidence offered by 
the Defendants included records from; 
I - 1985 
LANE F. SMITH, M.D. 
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES 
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D. 
SPINAL CLINIC PHYSICAL THERAPY 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL 
II - 1984 
W.E. HESS, M.D. 
THOMAS D. NOONAN. M.D. 
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D. 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL 
III - 1983 
ROBERT H. LAMB, M.D. 
FRANK DITURI, M.D. 
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL 
IV - 1981 
ROBERT S. HOOD, M.D. 
NATHIEL M. NORD, M.D. 
BOYD G. HOLBROOK, M.D. 
ROBERT H. LAMB. M.D. 
WESTERN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATES 
MARLIN W. DAHL. M.D. 
THOMAS D. NOONAN. M.D. 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL 
There were no objections to the medical evidence offered 
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by Plaintiff or Defendants and the Administrative Law Judge admitted 
them into evidence. The only witness called to testify at the 
hearing was the Plaintiff (R. 59, 118-265). 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge referred certain medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel as allowed under Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-77. The medical panel was to assign a percentage of 
permanent partial impairment to the Plaintiff's pre-existing lumbar 
condition. In addition, the medical panel was asked to apportion 
the additional percentage of permanent partial impairment 
attributable to each of the four industrial injuries as compared to 
the pre-existing condition (R. 269-270). 
The Medical Panel issued its report on November 28, 1988, 
after a thorough examination of Plaintiff and a complete review of 
all the medical records. The Medical Panel rated Plaintiffs 
pre-existing (pre 1981) lumbar condition at five percent whole 
person. The Medical Panel further found no rateable percent of 
permanent impairment for the lumbar condition attributable to each 
of the four industrial accidents (R. 271-283). On December 28, 
1988, Plaintiff filed written objections to the Medical Panel but 
did not request a hearing on his objections (R. 284-289). No new 
medical evidence was proffered (R. 290). 
On January 11, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge issued 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which analyzed 
the evidence and adopted the Medical Panel's findings as his own (R. 
290-295). 
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On February 9. 1989, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah. Said Motion for Review was 
denied by the Industrial Commission on June 1, 1989 (R. 301-302). 
Plaintiff then filed an Appeal with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on July 6, 1989. On October 2, 1989, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion that the Order of the Industrial 
Commission dated June 1, 1989, was not a final order of the 
Commission and as such was not appealable (R. vol. II, 6-8). On 
December 21, 1989, the Industrial Commission, by Supplemental Order, 
re-adopted its original Order of June 1, 1989, thereby affirming the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order denying the additional compensation 
benefits sought by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed this Action on January 19, 1990. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 7, 1981, Plaintiff was involved in an 
industrial accident sustaining injuries to his cervical spine (R. 
1). He underwent surgery for removal of three disc fragments and 
insertion of a bone plug in his cervical spine area on December 21, 
1981 (R. 258). On June 4, 1982, Plaintiff underwent a lumbar 
laminectomy at L4-L5 and had bilateral foraminotomies at L3, L4, and 
L5-S1 (R. 252). Plaintiff filed a claim for permanent partial 
impairment benefits for his lumbar, as well as cervical spine. The 
Utah State Insurance Fund (now the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah) denied benefits for the lumbar spine condition, claiming that 
there was no causal connection between the industrial accident of 
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December 7, 1981 and the subsequent June 4. 1982 lumbar surgery. 
The Plaintiff filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah and an evidentiary hearing was held on September 
13, 1982, (R. 336). At the conclusion of the hearing, due to the 
medical controversy, a medical panel was appointed (R. 352). The 
Medical Panel rated the Plaintiff's cervical spine impairment at 
twelve and one half percent (12.5%) whole person permanent 
impairment. The Panel further concluded that all of the cervical 
impairment was related to the industrial accident of December 7, 
1981. As for the lumbar spine, the Medical Panel found that the 
lumbar surgery performed June 4, 1982, was not necessitated by the 
Plaintiff's industrial accident of December 7, 1981. No permanent 
partial impairment was assigned to the lumbar spine as a result of 
the December 7, 1981 industrial accident. Plaintiff filed written 
objections to the Medical Panel Report. A hearing was held on the 
objections to the Medical Panel Report. The Medical Panel Chairman 
was present, as was Dr. Lamb, the Plaintiff's treating physician. 
The Chairman of the Medical Panel was not persuaded to change his 
mind after listening to Dr. Lamb's testimony. 
The Administrative Law Judge on May 2, 1983, adopted the 
findings of the Medical Panel as his own, awarding 12.5% permanent 
impairment for the cervical spine and denying benefits for the 
lumbar area, reasoning that the December 7, 1981 industrial injury 
did not result in a rateable impairment to the lumbar spine (R. 14). 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued 
by the Administrative Law Judge was not appealed and therefore. 
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should be considered res judicata. 
On August 30, 1983, Plaintiff sustained an industrial 
injury to his lumbar spine. Fifty dollars ($50.00) in medical 
benefits and no temporary total benefits were paid relative to that 
industrial accident (R. 38). 
On July 13, 1984, the Plaintiff sustained another 
industrial injury to his lumbar spine. The medical benefits were 
paid in the amount of four hundred twenty-five ($425.00). Plaintiff 
received six weeks or one thousand eight hundred sixty dollars 
($1,860.00) in temporary total benefits (R. 38). No permanent 
partial disability compensation was paid. 
On December 5, 1985, Plaintiff sustained an industrial 
injury resulting in an aggravation to his cervical spine. Medical 
expenses were paid in the amount of five thousand two hundred 
forty-six dollars and forty cents ($5,246.40). Two thousand nine 
hundred seven dollars ($2,907.00) were paid in temporary total 
benefits (R. 38). Again, no permanent partial compensation was paid. 
On April 21, 1988, Plaintiff filed four separate 
Applications for Hearing with the Utah State Industrial Commission 
seeking additional permanent partial impairment as well as various 
periods of temporary total compensation (R. 32-37). 
After an evidentiary hearing held before an administrative 
Law Judge on September 22, 1988, a medical panel was convened to 
help resolve certain medical issues. Among other things, the 
Medical Panel was asked to rate the percentage of Plaintiff's 
permanent lumbar impairment attributable to each of the industrial 
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injuries. The Medical Panel was also asked to formulate an opinion, 
based upon examination of Plaintiff and all of the medical records, 
as to the percentage of permanent partial lumbar impairment 
pre-existing the December 7, 1981, industrial accident (R. 112-270). 
On November 28, 1988, the Medical Panel issued its 
Report. With respect to Plaintiff's lumbar condition the Medical 
Panel found that no permanent partial impairment was attributable to 
the August 30, 1983, July 13, 1984 or December 5, 1985 industrial 
accidents. The Medical Panel also found that Plaintiff's permanent 
partial lumbar impairment pre-existing the December 7, 1981 
industrial accident was five percent (5%) whole person (R. 271-283). 
On January 11, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge issued 
his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order evaluating all 
of the evidence in the record and adopting the Medical Panel's 
findings as his own. The Administrative Law Judge reasoned that 
Plaintiff's combined impairments for the December 7, 1981 industrial 
injury did not meet the then existing greater than 20% threshold, 
required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-69. The 
Administrative Law Judge also found that there was no measurable or 
rateable permanent impairment attributable to Plaintiff's lumbar 
spine due to the December 7, 1981, August 30, 1983, July 13, 1984 or 
December 5, 1985, industrial accidents (R. 290-295). The 
Administrative Law Judge's Order resulting from his Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law resulted in: (1) The denial of any lumbar 
permanent impairment compensation because no such impairment was 
found attributable to any of the claimed industrial injuries; and 
7 
(2) The denial pre-existing lumbar benefits claimed as a result of 
the December 7, 1981 cervical industrial injury because of failure 
to meet the 20% permanent partial impairment threshold required in 
order to qualify for pre-existing unrelated impairments. (The Panel 
found only J5% permanent partial impairment pre-existing the December 
7, 1981 injury). 
The Order set forth above was affirmed by the Industrial 
Commission on June 1, 1989, and later as a Final Order on December 
21, 1989 by Supplemental Order. 
In summary, this Action, filed by Plaintiff on January 19, 
1990, attacks the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated 
January 11, 1989 as affirmed on December 21, 1989 by the full 
Commission. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues in this controversy are two-fold: 
(1) Whether the determinations of fact made by the 
Administrative Law Judge and affirmed by the Commission are 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the 
whole record before the Court? 
2) Whether the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission correctly interpreted and applied appropriate Utah 
Workers* Compensation Law to the facts so determined. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts in this controversy are not in dispute and 
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are set forth hereinabove in the Statement of the Case. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Order of the Commission, denying further permanent 
partial impairment benefits and limiting additional temporary total 
benefits was based upon findings of fact which were supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the Court. 
POINT II 
Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission 
erroneously interpreted or applied the Law in this controversy. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION, DENYING FURTHER PERMANENT 
PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT BENEFITS AND LIMITING ADDITIONAL 
TEMPORARY TOTAL BENEFITS WAS BASED UPON FINDINGS OF FACT 
WHICH WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED 
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT. 
Since the proceedings on Plaintifffs claims were commenced 
after the effective date of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA), Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), the 
Commission's decision properly should be reviewed by this Court 
under the standards set forth in that Act. See Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Under Section 63-46b-16 (4)(g), the findings of the Commission will 
be affirmed where they are "supported by substantial evidence when 
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viewed in light of the whole record before the Court." See 
Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (CA. 
11-28-89). 
In this case, there is indeed substantial evidence in the 
record submitted and viewed as a whole to support the findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission and to support the 
Medical Panel Report which was adopted by the Commission. A review 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge, (R. 290-295) shows clearly that the 
Administrative Law Judge carefully examined all of the evidence and 
all of the medical reports in the record prior to his decision 
adopting the Medical Panel Report as to: (1) the 5% permanent 
partial lumbar impairment pre-existing the December 7, 1981 cervical 
industrial injury, (2) the findings of no permanent impairment 
(lumbar) connected with the 1983, 1984, and 1985 industrial 
accidents of the Plaintiff, and (3) no permanent impairment 
(cervical) resulting from the 1985 industrial accident. It is true 
also that the full Commission in dealing with the Motion for Review 
filed by Plaintiff, reviewed the entire record and mentioned 
specifically in its Order Denying Motion for Review that the Medical 
Panel had reviewed all the various ratings given over the years, 
including the treating physician's rating, and had made a competent 
unbiased determination based on its own examination of the applicant 
and on the various other doctor's opinions and medical evidence 
submitted to the Panel by the Administrative Law Judge. The only 
evidence proffered by the Plaintiff was the evaluation by Dr. Lamb 
10 
which did not vary significantly from that of the Medical Panel both 
with respect to the lumbar impairment pre-existing the December 7, 
1981 cervical industrial injury and the permanent impairment 
attributed to the 1983 and 1984 industrial accidents of the 
Plaintiff. As indicated before, the Administrative Law Judge 
reviewed the entire medical record and the testimony and adopted the 
evaluations made by the Medical Panel consisting of two experienced, 
board certified specialists, one an orthopedist and one a 
neurologist. The Administrative Law Judge was careful to review all 
of the evidence in the record including the evaluation of the 
treating physician as well as the Medical Panel Report and his 
finding "that the preponderance of the medical evidence supports the 
findings of the Medical Panel" clearly is supported by substantial 
medical evidence under either the new or the old review standards. 
POINT II 
NEITHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE NOR THE COMMISSION 
ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED OR APPLIED THE LAW IN THIS 
CONTROVERY. 
Having made the appropriate findings with respect to the 
lumbar impairment which pre-existed the December 7, 1981 industrial 
cervical injury and the absence of any measurable permanent lumbar 
impairment attributable to either the 1983 or the 1984 lumbar 
industrial injuries of Plaintiff, the Administrative Law Judge (and 
the Commission) correctly interpreted and applied the applicable law 
to those findings. 
It is well established Utah Workers' Compensation Law that 
the threshold limits established by the Legislature in Section 
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35-1-69. Utah Code Annotated mean exactly what they say. That is. 
in order for compensation benefits to be paid for unrelated 
impairments, the industrial injury in questioned must result in at 
least 10% permanent partial impairment on an uncombined whole person 
basis and that the total impairment of the applicant must be greater 
than 20% permanent partial impairment. This was made clear by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the Streator Chevrolet case. 709 P.2d 1176. 
1181 (Utah 1985). The application of the threshold levels was 
further clarified in Otvos v. Industrial Commission. 751 P.2d 263 
(Utah App. 1988). where it was held that an applicant could not 
combine two prior injuries in order to reach the necessary threshold 
limit to become eligible for payment for unrelated impairments. In 
this case. Plaintiff does not qualify for the payment of any 
pre-existing lumbar impairment because he has failed to meet the 20% 
threshold limit for total impairment resulting from the combination 
of the industrial cervical injury plus the non-related pre-existing 
lumbar impairment. Therefore, under the rationale of the Streator 
Chevrolet and the Otvos decisions as well as the express language of 
the Statute, the Administrative Law Judge properly declined to grant 
Plaintiff compensation benefits for the unrelated 5% lumbar 
impairment. 
With respect to Plaintiff1s contention that there need not 
be any increase in permanent impairment in order to obtain 
compensation for pre-existing impairment in the same bodily area, 
the Administrative Law Judge properly applied the well-established 
Utah Law in Workers1 Compensation that there must be some measurable 
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permanent impairment in order to qualify for pre-existing permanent 
impairment even in an aggravation case. In fact, it is well 
established that there must, in fact, be a measurable permanent 
impairment to qualify as a compensable injury for any purposes. 
This Court made that clear in the recent decision in Zimmerman v. 
Industrial Commission. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 51, 52, where this Court 
affirmed the Commission denial of permanent benefits because the 
industrial accident did not result in a permanent impairment. 
Citing Streator Chevrolet. See also Intermountain Health Care Inc.. 
v. Ortega. Utah 562 P.2d 617. 619 (1977). where the "definite and 
measurable" interpretation of the words "substantially greater" was 
first set out by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In summary. the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission correctly interpreted and applied Utah Workers' 
Compensation law to the findings which were made by the 
Administrative Law Judge in adopting the Medical Panel Report with 
respect to the salient medical issues of the case. In viewing the 
record as a whole, it is clear that there was indeed substantial 
evidence in the record to support the findings of the Commission 
and. as mentioned above, the Commission correctly interpreted and 
applied the appropriate Utah Workers1 Compensation Law to those 
findings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Defendants have established and the record clearly shows 
that there is substantial evidence in the record when viewed as a 
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whole to support the factual determinations made by the 
Administrative Law Judge and affirmed by the Commission in this 
controversy. The record shows also that all the medical evidence, 
including the records and reports of Plaintiff's treating physician, 
were reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge as well as the 
Commission and, further, that all such medical records were provided 
to the Medical Panel convened to help resolve the medical issues and 
differences. Finally, the record as a whole shows that the Panel 
carefully reviewed the complete medical record in addition to its 
thorough examination of Plaintiff before issuing its detailed 
analysis which later was adopted by the Administrative Law Judge who 
also reviewed the medical evidence before making the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which eventually became the Final 
Order in this Case. Plaintiff has not shown and in our opinion 
cannot show that the challenged factual determinations are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, under 
this Court's Standards of Review, those factual determinations 
properly must be affirmed. 
It is equally apparent that the Commission has properly 
interpreted and applied established Utah Workers' Compensation Law 
in denying the additional benefits claimed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
clearly has not qualified under the threshold impairment statutory 
requirements in order to obtain compensation for pre-existing 
impairments which are unrelated to the industrial injuries. The 
Streator Chevrolet and the Otvos Decisions are among the cases 
recognizing and applying the threshold concept. 
14 
Likewise, the Commission properly recognized and applied 
the measurable permanent impairment concept for aggravation 
purposes. That concept also is well established and is found most 
recently in the Zimmerman Opinion issued by this Court on November 
28, 1989. 
Plaintiff has not sustained his burden with respect to 
either the factual or the legal determinations made by the 
Commission in this case. Therefore, the Order of the Commission 
properly should be affirmed and Plaintiff's action dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this , day of Mayt 1990. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
Defendant's Brief were delivered this day of May, 1990 to 
the following: 
David H. Schwobe, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark D. Dean, Esq. 
Attorney for WCFU 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICK M. SLOAN. 
Plaintiff (Petitioner) 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. ROTO 
ROOTER SERVICES and S & S ROOTER 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH and EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND. 
Defendants (Respondents). 
Case No. 900037-CA 
Classification #6 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statutory Provision: 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 35-1-24 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 35-1-69 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 35-1-77 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 35-1-86 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 63-46(b)(4) 
Utah Code Ann., Sect. 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
Addendum 
B r i e f Page 
. . 1 
7 . 12 
. . 2 
. . 1 
. . 9 
. 1 
No. Page No. 
1 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-24 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2; 
C.L. 1917, § 3077, subd. 1; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJJS. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 386. *» 1092. 
35-1-23. Petition for hearing — Contents. 
Such hearing shall be on verified petition filed with the commission, setting 
out specifically and in full detail the order upon which a hearing is desired 
and every reason why such order is unreasonable or unlawful and every issue 
to be considered by the commission on the hearing. The petitioner shall be 
deemed to have waived all objection to any irregularities and illegalities in 
the order upon which a hearing is sought other than those set forth in the 
petition. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2; 
C.L. 1917, § 3077, subd. 2; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-21. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 385. *» 1092. 
35-1-24. Hearing — Procedure. 
Upon receipt of such petition, if the issues presented therein have thereto-
fore been adequately considered, the commission shall determine the same by 
confirming, without hearing, its previous determination, or, if necessary to 
determine the issue presented, the commission shall order a hearing thereon 
and consider and determine the matter at such time as shall be prescribed. 
Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be given to the petitioner 
and to such other persons as the commission may find directly interested 
therein. If the order complained of is found to be unlawful or unreasonable, 
the commission shall substitute therefor such other order as may be lawful 
and reasonable. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subds. 3,4; 
CX. 1917, § 3077, subds. 3,4; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
5 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-22. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 385. <*» 1092. 
131 
ADD* 
PBGE i 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 35-1-69 
(2)(b)(i); added subds. (2)(b)(ii) to (2)(b)(iv); 
redesignated former subsec. (3) as subd. 
(2)(c)(i); added subds. (2)(c)(ii) and (2)(c)(iii); 
redesignated former subsec. (4) as subd. 
(2)(d); deleted the last two sentences of 
former subsec. (4) which provided that the 
employer or insurance carrier would pay ben-
efits to dependents out of the special fund as 
provided by former subsecs. (2) and (3), and 
to review the issue of dependency at the time 
application was made for additional benefits 
from the special fund; deleted former subsec. 
(5) which provided benefits to dependents at 
the rate of 66 % % of the deceased's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but 
not more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage, with a minimum of $45 per 
week out of the special fund beginning with 
the time that payments made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate 
and ending upon the termination of said 
dependency; redesignated former subsec. (6) 
as subd. (2)(e); increased the maximum 
award in subd. (2)(e) from $15,600 to $18,720; 
and substituted "second injury fund" for 
"special fund" at the end of subd. (2)(e). 
Constitutionality. 
Provision that death benefits are to be paid 
to state fund rather than to estate or family 
of decedent where there are no dependents of 
the deceased does not deprive such estate, 
family or survivors who are not dependents 
of the deceased of any constitutional right to 
seek redress for wrongful death as guaran-
teed in Article XVI, section 5, Constitution of 
Utah. Star v. Industrial Comm. (1980) 615 P 
2d 436. 
Dependency and dependent persons. 
Mother who was not wholly or partially 
dependent on deceased son for financial 
assistance to maintain her in her accustomed 
station in life was not entitled tc death bene-
fits; her loss of the love, affection, and com-
panionship of her dutiful son uas not com-
pensable under the act Star r. Industrial 
Comm. (1980) 615 P 2d 436. 
Level of benefits. 
In a case of injury arising before the effec-
tive date of this section as last amended but 
not heard until afterward, the level of bene-
fits to be awarded was determine by the law 
in effect at the time of the injuiy, not at the 
time of the award. Smith v. Industrial 
Comm. (1976) 549 P 2d 448. 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity — Payment 
out of second injury fund — Training of employee. (1) If any employee who 
has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or 
congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation and 
or medical caret or both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapac-
ity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had not had 
the pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by_ such pre-
existing incapacity, compensation a»d
 t medical care, wnicii mcdic&T care and other 
related items are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for such compensation aad 
t medical caret and other related items shall be for the industrial injury only and 
the remainder shall be paid out of the special second injury fund provided for in 
sec Lion oo-x-oo \±) ncrcmai xer rcierrcQ xo «9 tne special xunu. . 
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease, 
2E congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, 
medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis of ttie combined 
injuries as provided above; provided, however, that (b) where there is no such 
aggravation, no award for combined injuries shall be made unless the, percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injuiy is 10% or 
greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all 
causes and conditions, including the industrial injury, is greater than 20%. Where 
the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (1] (b) of this section previ-
ously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disabil-
ity under this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, such 
compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the second injury 
fund under this paragraph. 
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or other 
related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to this 
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section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible for all such 
temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the end of the period 
2f temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any allocation 
2 l disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following such period 
shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the second injury fund as 
provided for herein, and any payments made by the employer or its insurance car-
rier in excess of its proportionate share shall be recoverable at the time of the 
award for combined disabilities if any is made hereunder. 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical panel set forth in 
section 35-2-56, shall review all medical aspects of the case and determine first, 
the total permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions 
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the industrial injury; and third, the percentage of per-
manent physical impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or 
conditionsr whether due to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. The 
industrial commission shall then assess the liability for permanent partial disabil-
ity compensation and future medical care to the employer on the basis of the per-
centage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury 
only and the remainder any amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be pay-
able out of the said special second injury fund
 L provided, however, that medical 
expenses shall be paid in the first instance by_ the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Amounts, if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess of the portion 
attributable to the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed to the employer out 
of saM special the second injury fund upon written request and verification of 
amounts so expended. 
(2) In addition the commission in its discretion may increase the weekly com-
pensation rates to be paid out of such special fund, such increase to be used for 
the rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within the provisions of 
this chapter as may be certified to the commission by the rehabilitation department 
of the state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation and training; 
provided, however, that in no case shall there be paid out of such special fund for 
rehabilitation an amount in excess of $1,000. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; OL. 1917, 
§ 3140, subsec. 6; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 42-1-65; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, 
ch. 57, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 
1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, 
§ 7; 1973, ch. 67, § 6; 1981, ch. 287, § 4. 
No apportionment of insurer's liability. 
Where employee suffered aggravation of 
back injuries when involved in three separate 
accidents while working for two different 
employers insured by three different insur-
ance carriers, commission properly required 
last carrier to pay compensation for all per-
manent disability, medical expenses and 
temporary disability, in absence of statutory 
authority for apportionment. Mountain 
States Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah 
1975) 535 P 2d 1249. 
Preexisting contributing condition* 
Although the claimant may have had a 
preexisting disability, the commission find-
ngs, which are based on reasonable evidence 
hat the injury complained of is the sole 
cause of the disability for which the award is 
made, do not exceed its authority or indicate 
a capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable act 
Hafer's, Inc. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah 
(1974) 526 P 2d 1188. 
Where preexisting condition required no 
treatment prior to accident, but increased 
the resultant disability by one-third, 
employer was obligated to pay only two-
thirds of claimant's medical bills, while the 
special fund would pay the remaining third; 
the fact that the preexisting condition was 
quiescent prior to the injury did not render it 
"insubstantial" so as to make the employer 
liable for all costs incurred. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega (1977) 562 P 2d 
617. " -
Where preexisting condition increased the 
disability resulting from an industrial injury, 
the employer was obligated only to pay the 
portion of expense and disability attributable 
to the industrial injury and the special fund 
was obligated to pay the portion attributable 
to the preexisting condition. Intermountain 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to 
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56. 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same 
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
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35-1-86, Court of Appeals may review commission's ac-
tions. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order 
of the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any 
order. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 87; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3148; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; RS. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-80; L. 1965, ch. 67, § 1; 1987, ch. 
161, § 110; 1988, ch. 72, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, deleted the 
former first sentence relating to applicability 
of the rules of civil procedure, substituted 
"Court of Appeals" for "Supreme Court", and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, substituted "order" for "award" twice. 
Cross-References. — Extraordinary writs, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B. 
Supreme Court, jurisdiction, § 78-2-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Change of theory on appeal. 
Conditions precedent to review. 
Decisions reviewable. 
Standard of review. 
Change of theory on appeal. 
The rule that parties cannot try a case on 
one theory and then attempt to gain a reversal 
upon some other theory on appeal, not ad-
vanced on the trial, probably should not be ap-
plied as strictly to appeals under the Work-
men's Compensation Act Stanley v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 79 Utah 228, 8 P.2d 770 (1932). 
Conditions precedent to review. 
Where a claimant accepts compensation sug-
gested by commission and agreed to by insur-
ance carrier, but without formal hearing, there 
is no award to review. Johnson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937). 
Decisions reviewable. 
Only a final decision of the commission 
awarding or denying compensation is subject 
to review. Utah Consol. Mining Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 66 Utah 173, 240 P. 440 (1925). 
An interlocutory order of the commission 
denying employer's motion to dismiss on 
ground of res judicata is not reviewable. Utah 
Consol. Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 
Utah 173, 240 P. 440 (1925). 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing interpretations of general ques-
tions of law, appellate court applies a correc-
tion-of-error standard, with no deference to the 
expertise of the commission. Board of Educ. v. 
Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984). 
Administrative determination that individ-
ual was an employee for workers' compensa-
tion purposes, while entitled to some deference, 
was subject to judicial review to assure that it 
fell within the limits of reasonableness or ra-
tionality; thus, appellate court confined its re-
view to a determination of whether the facts 
supported the conclusion of law or whether the 
decision was contrary to the evident purpose of 
the statute. Board of Educ. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 672. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
» 1825. 
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Following the appeal referee's decision, 
Grace Drilling filed its appeal and sub-
mitted to the Board the written test report 
originally requested by the appeal referee. 
The Board refused to accept the proffered 
report stating that "[t]o consider such evi-
dence would deny the claimant due process 
by depriving him of the right to challenge 
and rebut the information contained there-
in." The Board further concluded the ap-
peal referee's decision was a correct appli-
cation of the Utah Employment Security 
Act, supported by competent evidence, and 
therefore, affirmed the award of unemploy-
ment compensation benefits to Mr. Goo-
dale. 
Grace Drilling raises two issues in this 
appeal claiming, (1) there is substantial evi-
dence that Mr. Goodale was terminated for 
just cause because he tested positive for 
drug use while on duty, and (2) the Board 
abused its discretion in refusing to consider 
the proffered test results. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES ACT 
These proceedings were commenced af-
ter January 1,1988, and thus our review is 
governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah Adminis-
trative Procedures Act ("UAPA").1 Sec-
tion 63-46b-16(4) governs judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings and pro-
vides: 
The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seek-
ing judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is 
1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1988 
Supp.). Section 63-46b-22(l) provides that the 
UAPA applies to "all agency adjudicative pro-
ceedings commenced by or before an agency on 
or after January 1, 1988 " Additionally, 
§ 63-46b-l(l)(b) provides, with our emphasis, 
that the UAPA governs judicial review of agency 
actions M[e]xcept as set forth in Subsection (2), 
and except as otherwise provided by a statute 
superseding provisions of [UAPA] by explicit ref-
erence to [UAPA/....H The Utah Employment 
Security Act has no such superseding provisions 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or 
as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of 
the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an un-
lawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow pre-
scribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency ac-
tion were illegally constituted as a de-
cision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion del-
egated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capri-
cious. 
Grace Drilling claims the Board's find-
ings of fact are not supported by substan-
tial evidence as required under 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g). No reported Utah case 
to date has directly addressed whether the 
UAPA modifiesr'the standard for reviewing 
the Board's findings of fact previously uti-
concerning judicial review, and therefore our 
review is governed by § 63-46b-16(4). We also 
note that the UAPA is substantially similar to 
the Uniform Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act (1981), 14 U.LJL 69 (1988) ("MSAPA"). 
See Utah A.PJL 1988-89, comments of the Utah 
Administrative Law Advisory Committee at 10 
(April 25, 1988). Specifically, 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(aHh) "are patterned after the 
comparable provisions in the MSAPA (Sections 
5-116(c)(1) through 5-116(c)(8))." Utah AJ>uL 
1988-89, supra, at 15. 
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(g) those mat ters described in Subsection (3)(a) 
through (f) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
grant ing or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, m its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1889 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use m the courts of the s tate 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, U tah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to c o u r t 
The court may a t any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff m the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF A P P E A L S 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4 Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com 
mences on the first Monday m January , next follow, 
m g the date of election A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in tha t office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve m the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Cour t 1968 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving * 
charge of a first degree or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of • 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for &' 
t raordmary writs involving a criminal convic 
tion, except those involving a first degree or cap>* 
tal felony, 
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